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Abstract. Recently a convex hull based human identification protocol
was proposed by Sobrado and Birget, whose steps can be performed by
humans without additional aid. The main part of the protocol involves
the user mentally forming a convex hull of secret icons in a set of graph-
ical icons and then clicking randomly within this convex hull. In this
paper we show two efficient probabilistic attacks on this protocol which
reveal the user’s secret after the observation of only a handful of authen-
tication sessions. We show that while the first attack can be mitigated
through appropriately chosen values of system parameters, the second
attack succeeds with a non-negligible probability even with large system
parameter values which cross the threshold of usability.
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1 Introduction
In a human identification protocol, a human user (the prover) attempts to au-
thenticate his/her identity to a remote computer server (the verifier). The user
has an insecure computer terminal under the control of an adversary. The ad-
versary can view the computations done at the user’s terminal as well as the
inputs from the user. In addition, the adversary has passive or active access to
the communication channel between the user and the server. Designing a secure
human identification protocol under this setting is hard, since the user can no
longer rely on the computational abilities of the terminal and has to mentally
perform any computations. The problem, then, is to find a secure method of
identification that is not computationally intensive for humans.
? This paper has been published in Information Security: 13th International Con-
ference, ISC 2010, Boca Raton, FL, USA, October 25-28, 2010, Revised Selected
Papers, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6531, pp. 24-30, 2011, Springer.
The full edition is available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/478.
In [1], Sobrado and Birget proposed a graphical human identification proto-
col that utilizes the properties of a convex hull. A variant of this protocol has
later appeared in [2]. In [3] Wiedenbeck et al. gave a detailed description of the
protocol from [1], with a usability analysis employing human participants. Since
the work reported in [3] is more comprehensive, we will adhere to the protocol
described therein for our security analysis in this paper. Following the term used
in [3], we call the protocol Convex Hull Click or CHC in short. In this paper,
we describe two probabilistic attacks on the protocol and show its weaknesses
against a passive eavesdropping adversary.
Related Work. The identification protocol of Matsumoto and Imai [4] was
the first attempt at designing a human identification protocol secure under the
aforementioned setting. The protocol, however, was shown to be insecure by
Wang et al. [5] who proposed some fixes but which render the resulting protocol
too complex to execute for most humans. Matsumoto also proposed some other
protocols in [6]. However, the security of these protocols can be compromised
after a few authentication sessions [7, 8]. Some other proposals for human iden-
tification protocols that have been shown to be insecure were proposed by the
authors in [9, 10, 11]. These protocols were cryptanalysed in [12, 13, 14].
Hopper and Blum proposed the well-known HB protocol, which is based on
the problem of learning parity in the presence of noise [8]. The protocol has some
weaknesses as it requires the user to send a wrong answer with a probability
between 0 and 0.5, which is arguably hard for most humans. Li and Teng’s
protocols [15] seem impractical as they require a large size of secret (3 secrets
of 20 to 40 bits). Li and Shum’s protocols [7] have been designed with some
principles in mind, such as using hidden responses to challenges. This loosely
means that the responses sent to the server are non-linearly dependent on the
actual (hidden) responses. However, the security of these protocols has not yet
been thoroughly analysed. Jameel et al. [16, 17] have attempted to use the gap
between human and artificial intelligence to propose two image-based protocols.
The security, however, is based on unproven assumptions. More recently, Asghar,
Pieprzyk and Wang have proposed a human identification protocol in [18]. The
usability of the protocol is similar to Hopper and Blum’s protocols. But an
authentication time of about 2 to 3 minutes is still not practical.
2 The CHC Human Identification Protocol
Denote the convex hull of a set of points Π by ch(Π). If a point P lies in the
interior or on the boundary of a polygon, we say that the point P is contained
in the polygon, or the polygon contains the point P . We denote the membership
relation “contains” by ∈. The convex hull of 3 points is a triangle and the two
terms will be used interchangeably.
2.1 The Protocol
In the CHC human identification protocol, the human prover H and the remote
(computer) verifier C choose k graphical icons from a set of n as a shared secret
in the setup phase. When H wants to prove its identity to C, the following pro-
tocol is carried out.
CHC Protocol.
1: C randomly samples a set of m graphical icons out of n, where m is a random
positive integer between n and some lower bound mmin. C ensures that at
least 3 of the k secret icons are included in these m graphical icons. These
icons are distributed randomly on the screen of the user’s computer terminal
within a rectangular frame and aligned in a grid.
2: Hmentally forms the convex hull of any 3 secret icons displayed on the screen
and randomly clicks a point contained in this convex hull. Notice that this
is equivalent to clicking on the convex hull of all the secret icons present in
the screen.
3: C repeats the process a certain number of times and accepts or rejects H
accordingly.
uunionsq
For the ease of analysis, we assume m to be fixed. In fact, we will later see
that once n and k are fixed, we do not have much freedom in choosing m, if
a certain attack is to be avoided. Furthermore, we replace graphical icons by
non-negative integer lattice points on a real plane, enclosed within a rectangular
area. The lattice points are identified by a unique integer label from the set
{1, 2, . . . , n} as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, throughout this text, we will use
the terms, icons and labels, interchangeably. We shall call the area enclosed in
the rectangle as the rectangular lattice area or simply the rectangle.
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Fig. 1. One round of the convex hull protocol. Here, n = 30, m = 25 and the user’s
secret is {7, 15, 27, 30}. The symbol × denotes the response point P ∈ R2.
2.2 Description of the Adversary
The adversary considered here is a passive shoulder-surfing adversary, A. The
goal of the adversary is to impersonate H by initiating a new identification
session with C, after observing a number of identification sessions between H
and C. It is assumed that the adversary cannot view the setup phase of the
protocol. However, every subsequent identification session can be viewed by the
adversary as a sequence of challenge-response pairs. The number of challenges
in an authentication session, denoted by r0, is chosen such that the probability
of A impersonating H with random clicks is very small. We assume that this
probability is less than ( 12 )
r0 .
3 Attack 1: Difference in Distributions
Our first observation is that C has to ensure that at least 3 out of k secret
labels are displayed on the screen. There is no such restriction on the non-secret
labels. Naturally, this may lead to two different probabilities for the secret and
non-secret labels. The probability that a secret label appears in a challenge is
1
k (k − 2)
(
k (k + 1)
2
− 3
)
On the other hand, the same probability for a non-secret label is
1
k − 2
1
n− k
(
m (k − 2)− k (k + 1)
2
+ 3
)
So for instance, when n = 112,m = 70 and k = 5, in r = 100 challenges, the
expected number of times a secret label appears is 80, compared to 61.68 for a
non-secret label. This observation immediately leads to the following probabilis-
tic attack.
Attack 1.
Input: r challenges.
Output: k labels.
1: Count the number of times each label appears in the r challenges.
2: Output the top k most frequently occuring labels.
uunionsq
The above algorithm has a high success rate provided the two aforementioned
probabilities differ considerably. We performed 1000 simulated attacks for two
different sets of system parameter values and the results are shown in Table 1.
As can be seen, the attack, on average, outputs almost all the secret labels even
with only 100 given challenges. This means only 100r0 =
100
10 = 10 identification
sessions. To avoid this attack, the two probabilities should be equal, which gives
the rule: n = 2kmk+3 . This limits allowable values of system parameters.
Table 1. Simulation Results for Attack 1
n m k r
Average Number of Probability of Finding
Secret Labels all k Secret Labels
112 70 5 100 4.6 0.622
500 200 12 100 11.4 0.554
4 Attack 2
In the CHC protocol, the user only has to form a convex hull of 3 labels. Thus,
in theory, there could possibly be an attack of complexity O(
(
m
3
)
). Our second
attack runs within this bound and outputs one of the k secret labels with high
probability.
4.1 The Attack
Let Γ1, . . . , Γ(m3 )
denote all the possible 3-combinations of m labels.
Attack 2.
Input: r challenge-response pairs with response points P1, . . . , Pr, respectively,
and a threshold τ .
Output: Label(s) with maximum frequency.
1: Test Set. Initialize C ← ∅. For 1 ≤ i ≤ (m3 ), if P1 ∈ ch(Γi), then C ←
C ∪ {Γi}.
2: Frequency List. For each Γ ∈ C, initialize freq(Γ )← 1.
3: for i = 2 to r do
4: For each Γ ∈ C, if Pi ∈ ch(Γ ), then freq(Γ )← freq(Γ ) + 1.
5: Thresholded Subset. C(τ) ← {Γ ∈ C|freq(Γ ) > τ}.
6: Frequency of labels. For each distinct label l in C(τ) compute:
freq(l)←
∑
Γ∈C(τ)|l∈Γ
freq(Γ )
7: Output all labels l′ such that freq(l′) = max
l∈C(τ)
{freq(l)}.
uunionsq
The simulation results for Attack 2 are shown in Table 2, where the Test
Set is chosen from a given set of challenge-response pairs such that the response
point is closest to the boundaries of the rectangle. As can be seen, with a non-
trivial probability at least one of the secret labels appears with the highest
frequency, i.e., the output of Attack 2. This is true even for large system param-
eter values used to mitigate brute force attack. The value of τ , or the threshold,
is chosen such that the size of C(τ) is at least 50. There is no particular rea-
son for this choice of τ , except to ensure that the size of C(τ) is reasonably
large. In all the simulation runs the bounding rectangle had end coordinates:
(0, 0), (13, 0), (0, 13), (13, 13).
Table 2. Output of Attack 2
Simulation Number n m k r Secret Appeared Sessions
1 112 90 5 20 77/100 = 0.77 10
2 30 83/100 = 0.83 14
3 50 95/100 = 0.95 20
4 320 200 12 20 46/100 = 0.46 83
5 30 46/100 = 0.46 125
6 50 59/100 = 0.59 163
4.2 Why does Attack 2 Work
The reason for the high success probability of Attack 2 is due to the following
qualitative result.
Result 1 Let P ∈ R2. Draw a line R1R2 that intersects P and divides the
rectangular lattice area into 2 partitions such that the two contain an almost
equal number of lattice points. Suppose R1P is shorter than R2P . Then the
labels of the lattice points around the vicinity of R1P will have higher values of
freq(.). Furthermore, the labels of the lattice points around the vicinity of R2P
will have lower values of freq(.).
Since the convex hull of any 3 secret labels is a triangle, on average, at least one
secret label has a higher probability to have a high value of freq(.). This explains
why Attack 2 is successful with high probability. Once one or more secret labels
are obtained through Attack 2, the adversary can attempt to impersonate H.
The adversary can do this even with fewer than k labels, in the hope that a
challenge will contain at least one of the secret labels obtained by the adversary.
This can happen with a non-negligible probability.
5 Conclusion
We have shown two attacks on the CHC protocol. The first attack outputs the
secret icons with high probability after observing a few authentication sessions.
We have proposed a formula which allows to find values of system parameters
for which this attack can be avoided. The second attack outputs a secret icon
with high probability after observing only a handful of identification sessions.
The attack can be used to impersonate the user with a non-trivial probability.
While in its current form, the protocol does seem to have significant weaknesses,
research can be done to find some variants of the protocol that are easy for
humans to compute while being secure at the same time.
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